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 Ce texte avertit les femmes qui ont subi 
le test de génétique prédictive (pgt) des 
risques de cancer du sein. Je m’inspire 
des écrits de Foucault sur l’éthique et 
je mets de l’avant la sexualisation des 
relations éthiques et subjectives entre-
tenue par le discours sur les risques gé-
nétiques du cancer du sein.
… [genetic testing] just gives me a 
sense of accomplishment that I am 
doing everything I can. … That I 
am being proactive in preventing 
it [breast cancer] from coming 
back. And plus it’s a good feeling 
… maybe I’m not in control but 
I feel like I do have control to a 
certain degree or that I’m doing 
the best I can … and it makes 
me very hopeful. You know? Be-
cause of all the other things I went 
through and the negative progno-
sis that I got from doctors. Like I 
don’t have to take their word … 
things can be different. 
—Annie1 (45 years old, under-
went single mastectomy plus 
radiation and chemotherapy 
for breast cancer diagnosed one 
year before interview)
This passage is taken from an inter-
view I conducted as part of my doc-
toral research which explored wom-
en’s experiences and understandings 
of their susceptibility to breast 
cancer, and how these were shaped 
by their involvement in predictive 
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genetic testing (pgt) for mutations 
in the brca1/2 genes.2 I begin with 
this quote because it illuminates the 
central argument developed in this 
paper: that participation in predic-
tive genetic testing for hereditary 
breast cancer risk constitutes part of 
an ongoing process of risk manage-
ment through which women con-
stitute themselves as active partici-
pants in their health. Furthermore, 
I suggest that these technologies are 
transformative in the sense that they 
help to effect shifts in how women 
relate to themselves and others (in 
particular their genetically-related 
female family members) as individ-
uals who are “at risk” for developing 
cancer, and who strive for health in 
light of their at-risk status.
In this paper, I combine my theo-
retical interest in risk governmentality 
with Michel Foucault’s work on ethics 
and care of the self in order to consider 
critically the forms of subjectivity and 
ethical relations that are cultivated by 
discourses on genetic risk for breast 
cancer. I illustrate and give life to 
these theoretical insights by drawing 
on interview data I collected for my 
doctoral research, with a particular 
focus on Annie, one of my study 
participants whose commentary 
opens this paper.  Before turning to 
the interview data, it is first necessary 
to situate predictive genetic testing 
within the broader neoliberal politics 
of health risk.   
Risk, Biotechnology and 
Neoliberalism
From the perspective of govern-
mentality, neoliberalism is seen as 
a political rationality that involves 
the shifting of power away from 
State intervention toward generat-
ing conditions that facilitate self-
regulation. Neoliberal programmes 
of governance include multiple 
practices and techniques that spec-
ify active citizen-subjects who are 
incited to “enterprise themselves, 
to maximize their quality of life 
through acts of choice” (Rose 57) 
and who are encouraged to make 
responsible choices for themselves 
and for those to whom they are 
connected. As Nikolas Rose sug-
gests:
 
Within this new regime of the 
actively responsible self, indi-
viduals are to fulfil their na-
tional obligations ... through 
seeking to fulfil themselves 
within a variety of micro-moral 
domains or “communities”—
families, workplaces, schools, 
leisure associations, neighbour-
hoods. Hence the problem [for 
government] is to find means 
by which individuals may be 
made responsible through their 
individual choices for them-
selves and those to whom they 
owe allegiance… (57)
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Discourses on health risk are central 
to neoliberal modes of governance 
since their prevailing focus on indi-
vidual behaviours and lifestyle modifi-
cations have helped to solidify a shift in 
responsibility for health from the State 
to individuals and their families. The 
proliferation of discourses on genetic 
risk further individualizes health risks, 
and responsibility for the management 
of health risks, within the context of 
(geneticized) familial relations. The 
practice of pgt for breast cancer 
provides a contemporary gendered 
example of geneticization (Lippman 
19) of cancer risk, where geneticiza-
tion refers to the increasing reliance 
on genetic technologies to manage 
health problems (Lippman 19). By 
focusing on the detection of genetic 
mutations that increase a woman’s 
probability of getting breast cancer, 
pgt privileges the female body as the 
appropriate site for technologically-
mediated risk identification, surveil-
lance, and management, and thus 
deflects attention from cancer risks 
that are produced in the physical 
environment and that are exacerbated 
by broader social structures and the 
social determinants of health. 
Furthermore, discourses on geneti-
cally-transmitted health risks imply 
that individuals must acquire knowl-
edge about their genetic risks in order 
to make “informed choices” about 
their health (Petersen and Bunton 
57-8). This emphasis on informed 
choices links the exercise of agency 
in gaining knowledge about one’s 
genetic risks with that of demonstrat-
ing personal responsibility for heath 
through the adoption of individual-
ized risk management strategies (e.g. 
monitoring and modifying one’s 
diet). This is a particularly seductive 
strategy of governing women’s health 
since, in taking active measures 
to become knowledgeable about 
health risks, women must necessar-
ily rely on medical authorities and 
other health-related professions and 
disciplines(e.g. genetic counselling, 
epidemiology) that are invested in 
constructing and framing knowledge 
of breast cancer risk. 
By situating the body as neither 
healthy nor diseased but somewhere 
in-between, discourses on health risk 
provoke a constant awareness of the 
body and thus recruit individuals 
into multiple “processes of endless 
self-examination, self-care and self-
improvement” in order to maintain 
their health and wellbeing (Petersen 
194). With specific reference to breast 
cancer, Sandra Gifford suggests that 
the ambiguity engendered by dis-
courses on risk “results in the creation 
of a new state of being healthy and 
ill; a state that is somewhere between 
health and disease and that results in 
the medicalization of a woman’s life” 
(215). Feminist analysis that focuses 
on the links between discourses on 
genetic risk for breast cancer and 
women’s experiences of their risks 
in the context of their participation 
in predictive genetic technologies is 
particularly important given the his-
tory of the medicalization of women’s 
bodies and current trends in what Batt 
and Lippman call “neomedicaliza-
tion” (50). Neomedicalization is a by-
product of neoliberal policies which 
aim to minimize social spending 
while expanding women’s “choices” 
in health through the promotion of 
technologies, drugs and devices that 
capitalize on (the construction of ) 
risks for future disease in order to 
stimulate economic growth (Batt and 
Lippman 50-1).
Michel Foucault’s later work on 
ethics and care of self is particularly 
useful as a frame to understand wom-
en’s experiences of their genetic risks 
for breast cancer in relation to their 
participation in pgt. In particular, 
and as I will illustrate, his elaboration 
of askesis, which he describes as the 
work that one performs on oneself 
in order to transform oneself into 
the ethical subject of one’s behaviour 
(Rabinow xxxiii; Foucault, “On the 
Genealogy of Ethics” 265), is useful 
to understand how women’s experi-
ences of their genetic risks for breast 
cancer are informed by their already 
existing commitments to be active 
participants in their health. Related 
to the concept of ethical work is 
Foucault’s notion of the “care of the 
self ” which he conceived as a practice, 
an activity in which one, by paying 
attention to oneself, produces one’s 
self as an object and lifelong project 
(Foucault, “The Ethics of the Con-
cern for Self ” 285). Foucault suggests 
that, in modernity, the principle of 
caring for oneself was supplanted by 
the imperative to “know oneself ”, to 
equip oneself with the truth about 
one’s self (Foucault, “Technologies of 
the Self ” 228). Trent Hamann points 
out that, in contemporary forms of 
health care, knowledge of the self 
is largely mediated by disciplines 
such as biology, epidemiology, and 
genomics: 
These forms of knowledge … 
become crucial to the emerging 
biopolitical forms of govern-
mentality. Whereas individuals 
were once urged to take care of 
themselves by using self-reflex-
ive ethical techniques to give 
form to their freedom, modern 
biopolitics ensures that indi-
viduals are already taken care 
of in terms of biological and 
economic forms of knowledge 
and practices (Hamann 56)
Cressida Heyes extends the think-
ing of other Foucauldian feminists 
(in particular, Sandra Bartky and 
Susan Bordo) to consider the ethical 
practices and processes of self-trans-
formation that gendered technologies 
of discipline invite. While Heyes 
commends these scholars for illu-
minating how patriarchy operates 
through disciplinary power (72-3), 
she extends their arguments to 
consider how processes of discipline 
enhance certain capacities and skills 
and create possibilities for women to 
reflect on and consider the forms of 
the `care of the self` that underwrite 
their art of living (8). Focusing spe-
cifically on dieting as a disciplinary 
technology, Heyes suggests that by 
focusing only on the ends sought by 
such technologies (the privileging of 
the ideal, slender feminine body), 
feminist analysis runs the risk of 
VOLUME 28, NUMBERS 2,3 73
overlooking how such technologies 
are implicated in processes of ethical, 
self-transformation. Such a shift in 
focus can provide further insight 
into the micro-operations of power 
and instances when such technolo-
gies generate non-normative, creative 
responses that have the potential to 
disturb the logic of discipline. While 
Heyes concedes that disciplinary 
technologies have the potential to 
build women’s capacities in multiple 
directions, she also acknowledges 
the seductive qualities of such tech-
nologies which, in usurping the 
language of empowerment and care 
of the self, govern women through 
the intensification power relations 
(Heyes 85-6). 
In light of these theoretical formu-
lations and critiques, I now turn to my 
case study to explore further women’s 
understandings and experiences of 
their susceptibility to breast cancer 
as they went through the process of 
pgt, and to consider specifically how 
discourses on genetic risk for breast 
cancer target and transform ethical 
relations as objects of governance.
Genetic Testing as Risk 
Management and Ethical Practice 
In my analysis of women’s experi-
ences of their genetic risks for breast 
cancer, I argue that the process of 
pgt effects a transformation both in 
how the women in my study came 
to understand their susceptibility to 
breast cancer, and how they came to 
understand and act on themselves as 
women who were particularly vul-
nerable to the threat of breast can-
cer given their family histories of the 
disease (Polzer 133; Polzer and Rob-
ertson 37-8). Though subtle, this 
shift was significant and involved a 
change in subjectivity from what I 
called being an “active participant in 
health” to becoming a “(pro)active 
manager of genetic risk.” 
Far from being passive recipients 
of a diagnosis of genetic risk, the 
women in my study pursued genetic 
testing as part of an overall strategy 
to be “active participants” in their 
health. Learning about their risk 
genetically did not suddenly make 
these women experience themselves 
as “at risk” for breast cancer, for they 
already had strong notions of their 
vulnerability to breast cancer prior 
to genetic counselling based on their 
experiences of having witnessed di-
rectly or heard stories about women 
in their families who had suffered 
with and died from the disease. With 
this embodied knowledge already in 
place, the study participants lived, 
not necessarily in fear, but with the 
threat of breast cancer firmly lodged 
“in the back of their minds.” 
With the threat of breast cancer 
firmly in the back of their minds, 
the women in my study were already 
engaged in a number of risk manage-
ment activities before they went to 
genetic counselling in order to “take 
charge” of their health. For Annie, 
knowing that so many women in her 
family had had breast cancer served as 
a “wake up call” that she had to make 
extra efforts to try to prevent cancer. 
I suggest that the risk management 
activities that these women adopted 
(which included making modifica-
tions to their eating and exercise 
habits and participating in various 
forms of regular breast screening) 
constituted the askesis—that is, the 
ethical work—through which they 
constituted themselves as ethical 
subjects of risk. While the women 
did not feel that they had control 
over breast cancer, or that they could 
fully prevent disease, they felt that, 
through their participation in risk 
management activities, they could, 
and therefore should, exert control 
over certain aspects of their health 
in light of their family histories of 
disease. It was this control over health, 
and not the prevention of disease, 
that constituted the telos of their 
ethical work—that is, the ends sought 
through the work they performed on 
themselves through their participa-
tion in risk management activities. 
Arriving at genetic counselling 
already as active participants in their 
health, the women in this study 
saw genetic testing as a “unique 
opportunity” to take even further 
control of their health by expanding 
their options for risk management. 
The options they mentioned most 
frequently included prophylactic 
medication (Tamoxifen), preven-
tive surgery (mastectomy), and 
new forms of screening (magnetic 
resonance imaging or mri) that 
were not widely available but were 
in the process of being evaluated 
through clinical research. Genetic 
testing was at times described as a 
“door opener” to difficult-to-access 
health services, with mri screening 
in particular highlighted as a service 
one could “qualify” for as a result of 
their participation in genetic testing. 
This was the case for Annie, who had 
already had breast cancer, and who 
felt that genetic testing would help 
“direct” her towards new screening 
options which she felt would help 
her to keep a “closer look” over her 
body for signs of a recurrence. As 
she put it: 
Genetic testing was at times described as a “door opener” to difficult-
to-access health services. This was the case for Annie, who had already 
had breast cancer, and who felt that genetic testing would help “direct” her 
towards new screening options which she felt would help her to keep
a “closer look” over her body for signs of a recurrence.
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 …If I have to summarize my 
whole experience with genetic 
testing... [I’d say] I’m glad that 
it opened doors for me to keep a 
closer look. To have more screen-
ing and it gives me direction of 
how I should—why I should— 
do certain things with myself or 
with my life or with my body. 
You know?  …It’s better to know 
than not to know. 
their memories of familial disease, as 
the genetic testing process unfolded, 
and as they were presented with new 
options for risk management, their 
susceptibility to breast cancer was 
increasingly described as something 
that could be personally managed 
and “decreased” through their own 
individual actions. This transformed 
understanding of their susceptibility 
to breast cancer merged with their 
knowledge of their vulnerability to 
breast cancer based on their family 
histories of the disease. From this 
perspective, the effects of pgt can 
be read as simultaneously enabling 
and constraining. On the one hand, 
gaining knowledge about their ge-
netic risks can be interpreted as en-
abling in the sense that it formed the 
basis of new understandings of their 
susceptibility and new risk manage-
The above quote captures elo-
quently the notion that knowledge 
of the self is a fundamental element 
in the care of the self. For Annie, as 
for the other women in my study, 
gaining knowledge about genetic risk 
not only provided her with informa-
tion about her susceptibility to breast 
cancer (about which she was already 
knowledgeable), but also constituted 
part of a process of learning about 
how she should direct her activities 
in her everyday life as someone who 
was particularly susceptible to breast 
cancer given her family history of 
the disease.  
By providing women with a 
number of previously unavailable or 
restricted risk management options, 
pgt was not seen by Annie and the 
other women in my study as limit-
ing what they could do. Rather, pgt 
was envisioned as enabling them to 
choose a particular course of action 
for themselves as part of their ongoing 
efforts to manage their risks for cancer 
and take matters of health into their 
own hands. As the women were pre-
sented with these new options for risk 
management, they came to articulate 
their susceptibility to breast cancer as 
something that was amenable to their 
individual control. Whereas prior 
to genetic testing the women were 
called to take charge of their health by 
already existing risk management 
regimes. As suggested below, Annie’s 
positive genetic test result not only 
widened her selection of risk manage-
ment opportunities, but also acted as 
a “constant reminder” that she should 
be hyper-vigilant in her efforts to 
“reduce” her risks for cancer:
I know that I’m more susceptible 
[to breast cancer] than before but 
it’s not like it’s a panic thing … 
it’s more of an “Okay. I have to 
do everything I possibly can.” …
I’m trying to do the best I can to 
decrease my risk factor. …  I’ll be 
more careful about things. I’ll be 
more observant.…  It’s a constant 
reminder that I really have to 
watch out for things. I shouldn’t 
forget my vitamins. I shouldn’t 
forget eating properly … it just 
makes me more careful....  
Discussion
As Annie’s case suggests, women 
who pursue pgt for breast cancer 
do so not to learn about their genet-
ic fates. Rather, the interpretation I 
offer here suggests that women seek 
knowledge about their genetic risks 
for breast cancer in order to engage 
in particular kinds of self-care prac-
tices in light of their already existing 
ment directions they could pur-
sue as women who were genuinely 
concerned about developing breast 
cancer given their past experiences 
of cancer in their families. At the 
same time, by opening up a num-
ber of new possibilities for screening 
and risk management, the practice 
of pgt inserted the women into an 
expanded network of surveillance 
and encouraged them to internalize 
and embody a technological gaze, a 
phenomenon Ann Robertson refers 
to as “swallowing the Panopticon” 
(Robertson 303). 
In this sense, the process of pgt 
had the effect of harnessing women’s 
concerns and energies toward a 
new spectrum of risk management 
techniques. As suggested by Annie’s 
account, gaining access to mri 
screening has the potential to make 
women feel as though they can “keep 
a closer look” over their risky (po-
tentially cancerous) bodies. In turn, 
this suggests that the new forms of 
surveillance introduced by pgt may 
be experienced by women as reassur-
ance that they are being cared for in a 
cancer care system that is increasingly 
oriented towards the surveillance of 
risk factors. This is supported by Scott 
et al. who argue that participation in 
genetic testing services has the effect 
of making those who are eligible for 
As the genetic testing process unfolded, and as they were presented 
with new options for risk management, their susceptibility to breast cancer 
was increasingly described as something that could be personally 
managed and “decreased” through their own individual actions.
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testing feel as though they are being 
“looked after”:  
references to being monitored, 
cared for, looked out for, and 
being supervised … signify a 
desire for surveillance and en-
gagement with a health care 
system that will constantly 
check and ‘keep an eye on’ the 
patient-client. In that sense, 
patient-clients are … seeking 
ways of organizing health care 
resources around their specific 
and particular needs and life-
worlds. (Scott et al. 1876)
At the same time, it should not be 
forgotten that, while women may be 
provided with a greater number of 
options for risk management, and 
while this may instil in them a sense 
of self-control and being looked after, 
they are not in control of deciding 
the menu of options from which they 
choose (Batt and Lippman 52). 
Although not explored in this 
paper, pgt also has implications for 
how women relate to their (genetically 
related) family members. As discussed 
elsewhere, individuals undergoing 
pgt for cancer risk often see them-
selves as having a “genetic responsibil-
ity” (Hallowell) to family members 
to “pass on” information about their 
genetic risk and to encourage these 
relatives to manage their cancer risks 
accordingly. In this sense, predictive 
genetic technologies demarcate “the 
family” as a territory of governance 
that links the ethic of maintaining per-
sonal health with political objectives 
to optimize the health of the popula-
tion (Polzer, Mercer and Goel 163). 
Such responsibilities that emerge in 
the context of pgt are thus suggestive 
of the influence of knowledge about 
biological, genetically-transmitted 
vulnerabilities on familial relations 
and obligations (Polzer, Mercer and 
Goel 163). 
The recent introduction of vol-
untary human papillomavirus ( hpv 
) vaccination programs in Canada 
is interesting to consider in light of 
the theoretical frame explored here. 
Discourses on  hpv  (a common, 
sexually-transmitted virus which 
can lead to cervical cancer in cases 
of persistent infection with high-
risk strains) are similar to those on 
genetic risk for breast cancer in the 
sense that they situate female bodies 
as carriers of risks for future disease 
and as appropriate sites for biotech-
nological intervention. However, 
unlike pgt for breast cancer, there 
appears to be a glaring absence of 
appeals to informed “choices” and de-
cision-making in both industry- and 
government-sponsored information 
materials about hpv vaccination. This 
is, perhaps, unsurprising given that 
the school-based immunization pro-
grams aim to vaccinate girls prior to 
sexual onset, citizens-in-the-making 
who are not-yet capable of governing 
their own freedoms. Rather, hpv  vac-
cination discourse consistently calls 
upon parents, in particular mothers, 
to “protect” their daughters by get-
ting them vaccinated and positions 
the vaccine as marking an important 
opportunity for parent-child com-
munication about health risks and for 
general relationship-building. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, I suggest that femi-
nist readings of Foucault’s elabora-
tions on ethics and care of the self 
provide meaningful insight into 
how discourses on genetic risk for 
breast cancer, and the health care 
practices they engender, are impli-
cated in  the cultivation of particu-
lar kinds of ethical relations. This 
theoretical lens can be particularly 
fruitful to understand how contem-
porary developments in women’s 
health technologies govern women’s 
conduct by channelling their ener-
gies, and their ethical freedoms, in 
particular ways. While, in theory, 
health risk biotechnologies have 
the potential to generate multiple 
responses from women, and while 
they may facilitate early detection 
and access to cancer care resources 
for some women, the potential for 
such technologies to harness wom-
en’s ethical capacities and freedoms 
towards technological ends must 
not be underestimated. 
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1“Annie” is a pseudonym.
2This study was conducted in an 
urban setting in Ontario where 
predictive genetic testing (pgt) for 
hereditary breast, ovarian and co-
lon cancers are included as insured 
health services for individuals whose 
family histories indicate a possible 
genetic predisposition. The process 
of pgt is complex and involves a 
number of components, including 
the completion of family history 
forms, the construction of a fam-
ily “pedigree” (family tree), genetic 
counselling, and mutation testing 
for those whose family histories sug-
gest a possible genetic predisposi-
tion. The brca1 and brca2 genes 
are tumour-suppressor genes which 
normally function to inhibit cell 
growth. Inherited forms of breast 
cancer account for a small propor-
tion of all breast cancers; however, 
and although estimates vary, muta-
tions in either the brca1 or brca2 
genes have been found to signifi-
cantly increase a woman’s risk of de-
veloping breast cancer in compari-
son to the general population (see 
Heisey et al.).   
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